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The Economies of Bargaining Rights 
in the Fisheries of Nova Scotia 
and Atlantic Canada 
Charles Steinberg 
This paper contends that the légal précédents which hâve 
until so recently discouraged positive Canadian législation, 
and which could still invalidate fresh législative efforts, are 
based on an outdated view of the économie relations of fish-
ermen and fish buyers. The following briejly examines the 
économie underpinnings of the Canadian jishermen's right to 
bar gain, with spécial référence to Nova Scotia and Atlantic 
Canada. 
Canadian fishermen suffer a kind of légal triple jeopardy when they 
attempt to bargain collectively. This paper 1 contends that the légal pré-
cédents which hâve until so recently discouraged positive Canadian légis-
lation, and which could still invalidate fresh législative efforts, are based 
on an outdated view of the économie relations of fishermen and fish buy-
ers. The following briefly examines the économie underpinnings of the 
Canadian fishermen's right to bargain, with spécial référence to Nova 
Scotia and Atlantic Canada. 
THE ISSUES 
The crux of the légal problem is that fishermen who hâve no equity 
in a fishing vessel are held by the courts to be « coadventurers », that is, 
limited partners with the vessel owners in the fishing enterprise because 
such fishermen are customarily paid 
by share of the catch proceeds. 
Since «Sharesmen» (so-called here-
l The source of this review is Charles Steinberg, Collective Bargaining Rights 
In The Canadian Sea Fisheries : A Case Study of Nova Scotia, Columbia Uni-
versity, Ph.D. dissertation, May 1, 1973. I want also to acknowledge gratefully a 
Canada Department of Labor contract which resulted in the preliminary study, 
Industrial Relations In The Nova Scotia Fisheries. The Department of Labour, of 
course, bears no responsibility whatever for my data, analysis, or conclusions. 
STEINBERG, C , Associate Professor 
of Economies, Dalhousie University, 
Halifax, N.S. 
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after) are not considered « employées », they were denied access to 
collective bargaining law except in the récent and untested législation noted 
below. The boatowners (Independent Fishermen, hereafter) are held to be 
entrepreneurs, and on thèse grounds are also excluded from bargaining law. 
Moreover, when collective bargaining is arranged by mutual con-
sent2 between Independent Fishermen and fish buyers outside the law, 
the bargainers are subject to anti-combines statutes which exempt labour 
but define fish as an article of commerce. If a complaint is sustained by 
the courts, the fishermen are held in restraint of trade. 
Even unions of Sharesmen are liable on the same anti-combines 
grounds when negotiations concern the price of fish (a critical earnings 
variable) rather than the share itself, or other conditions of employment. 
Thus, regardless of their property rights in the enterprise, ail Canadian 
fishermen's efforts to unionize and bargain are doubly jeopardized, first 
by shaky bargaining rights, and then by contradictory anti-combines law. 
The third pitfall is described below. 
THE BACKGROUND 
Despite the bargaining handicaps, fishermen hâve persisted in seek-
ing collective bargaining as a remedy for their économie problems, much 
as did other North American workers prior to the législative relief of the 
mid-1930's. 
For over 75 years organized Canadian fishermen hâve been bargain-
ing with processors and canners in British Columbia3 on a « voluntary » 
basis : outside the framework of established British Columbia labour 
law, and in tension-filled and often unstable bargaining conditions. 4 
Canadian East coast fishermen fared even worse. At least four bitter, 
spontaneous strikes erupted in Nova Scotia since the 1930's. Yet no 
2 That is, as an outeome of bitter économie struggle. 
3 Stuart JAMIESON and Percy GLADSTONE, «Unionism In The Fishing 
Industry of British Columbia », Canadian Journal of Economics and Political 
Science, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Feb. 1950, and their companion article, «Unionism In 
The Fishing Industry of British Columbia», Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science, Vol. XVI, No. 2, May 1950, pp. 146-171. 
4
 John D. BOYD, The Industrial Relations System of the Fishing Industry, 
Project # 55 (s), Draft Study, Task Force on Labour Relations, Privy Council 
Office, Nov. 1968. 
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formai bargaining relationship emerged until July, 1969, and this one, 
too, was initially based on voluntary récognition of the fishermen's union 
by the fish processor. 5 
Fishermen of the other East coast provinces had equally difficult 
times in establishing collective bargaining rights. The provincial « Fisher-
men's Fédération Acts » of the early 1950's were ineffective in promoting 
unionization and subséquent bargaining rights. 6 
It was not until March 18th, 1971, that Nova Scotia enacted législa-
tion allowing Sharesmen to bargain under the Nova Scotia Trade Union 
Act. 7 The just concluded voluntary agreements were then quickly certified 
under the Act as bona fide union management contracts. Newfoundland 
followed suit June 2, 1971.8 The fédéral government did so on March 
lst, 1973, with a bill that also purported to allow certain fishermen 
(presumably the same Sharesmen covered by the provincial acts) collec-
tive bargaining rights under the Canada Labour Act.9 British Columbia, 
with its extensive fisheries, and old unions still has no such législation. 
This récent flurry of lawmaking, especially in the East coast prov-
inces, has encouraged the establishment of some additional bargaining 
s
 Collective Agreement Between National Sea Products Ltd. and Local 606c 
Canadian Brotherhood of Railway and General Workers, Canadian Labour Con-
gress, Halifax, N.S., July 24th, 1969. 
6
 Fisherman's Fédération Act, R.S. Newf. 1951, c. 70 
Fisherman's Fédération Act, R.S. P.E.I. 1951, c. 61 
Fisherman's Fédération Act, R.S. N.B. 1952, c. 89 
Fisherman's Fédération Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 110. 
7
 An act to amend c 311 of the revised statutes the Nova Scotia Trade Union 
Act, Bill No. 11, Spring Session, 1971 : 
«68 B (1) Subject to subsection (3), this act shall apply to persons who are 
employed or engaged on fishing vessels of ail types, or in the opér-
ation of such vessels on the water, and such persons shall be deemed 
to be employées for the purposes of this act. 
(21) For the purpose of this Section a person is «employed or engaged» 
if he is paid wages or if he accepts or agrées to accept a percentage 
or other part of the proceeds of the venture or of the catch in lieu 
of or in addition to wages ». 
Thus, the amendment's définition of «employed or engaged» excludes Inde-
pendent Fishermen. 
8 The Fishing Industry (Collective Bargaining) Act, S. Nfld, 1971, No. 53, 
though there was at first some doubt as to its status. 
9 An Act to amend the Canada Labour Code, S.C. 1972, c. 18. 
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units, but the hurdles yet faced by fishermen are neither eliminated or 
surmounted. The massive légal obstacles just described remain as a threat. 
This threat could become a bar to further unionization and continued 
collective bargaining whenever an aggrieved party chooses either to chal-
lenge the existing législation in the courts on the strength of the « co-
adventurers » doctrine, or attack via the Anti-Combines route. Both 
actions were employed successfully in the past10 
The unresolved constitutional question of whether it is the fédéral 
or the provincial governments that hâve jurisdiction over the labour 
relations of fishermen compounds the two issues described, and is the 
third very real jeopardy. n 
Sweeping changes since World War II hâve transformed the fisheries 
from the days when fishing might possibly hâve been thought a joint 
venture for Sharesmen, and Independent Fishermen could be taken as 
simple entrepreneurs. Let us examine thèse movements and trace their 
effects on Nova Scotia and Atlantic Canada. 
ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE IN THE FISHERIES 
A gênerai downward pressure on fish priées (and therefore fishing 
incomes) appeared at the mid-1920's, and lasted through the dépression 
of the Thirties.12 Thèse price movements were accompanied by a market 
shift from sait to fresh, and fresh processed fish that is still in progress 
today. The demand for fresh fish, and increasing international compéti-
tion in Canada's major U.S. market outlets, required, and inevitably led 
to profound changes in vessel power, speed, and fish catching ability. 
Great increases were also needed in complementary shoreside freez-
ing, holding, and processing facilities, as well as extensions and modifica-
10 The Dissertation, supra, pp. 206-247. 
11
 Twelve British Columbia fishing firms hâve asked the fédéral courts to 
forbid the Canada Labour Relations Board from certifying the United Fishermen 
and Allied Workers' Union as bargaining agent for British Columbia fishermen 
on grounds, inter alia, that the Act is ultra vires the parliament of Canada, The 
Halifax Mail Star, Friday, August 31, 1973, p. 2. 
12 See Report of the Royal Commission Investigating The Fisheries of the 
Maritime Provinces and the Magdalen Islands, King's Printer, Ottawa, 1928 ; and 
Report on the Canadian Atlantic Sea-Fishery, Royal Commission on Provincial 
Development and Rehabilitation, Stewart Bâtes, King's Printer, Halifax, N.S., 1944. 
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tions in ancillary transportation. The new market requirements stimulated 
in Atlantic Canada (a quarter-century later than in New England) a 
virtual technological révolution in the race against fish spoilage. 
FISHING METHODS AND VESSELS 
From about 1881 to World War II, longlining by hand from schooner 
delivered dories remained the major method of Offshore ground-fishmg. 
Throughout the Twenties and Thirties, both Inshore and Offshore hook 
and line fishermen successfully resisted the introduction of otter trawling 
(dragging huge bagnets astern). Consequently, larger schooners were built, 
diesel engines and electronic gear were added, but schooners still con-
tinued to set longlines from dories until just after World War IL 13 
Wartime needs lifted the restriction on otter trawling. The modest 
government small loans system started in the Thirties as dépression aid 
was escalated into a major shipbuilding subsidy program that completely 
transformed the Canadian East coast fleet in a décade and a half. The 
pole-masted diesel schooner disappeared overnight. 
A whole new fleet of large processor owned steel and wooden side and 
stern otter trawlers was created. The new vessels ranged to over 900 
gross tons with price tags to $2.Vi million. Even the world famous 
schooner Bluenose, built with racing ambitions, had cost only $33,580 
without her gear. Today, thèse otter trawlers dominate Canadian Off-
shore ground-fishing. More important, the industry's entire économie 
centre of gravity shifted from a small-boat Inshore fishery to a major 
Offshore fishery. 
THE IMPACT OF THE SHIPBUILDING SUBSIDY PROGRAM 
Gross government14 expenditures on vessel subsidies alone from 
1947-48 though March, 1969, amounted to over $83.5 million for the 
Atlantic Provinces, not counting direct and indirect provincial subsidy 
programs, nor, for example, the Nova Scotia Fishermen's Loan Board's 
1344 low interest loans which totaled $36.8 million, 1960-1970. 
13 The point of the 1928 Royal Commission Supra was to investïgate this 
problem, and it recommended a restriction of otter trawling which held until 1942. 
14 The Dissertation, pp. 46-60. 
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The effect on Atlantic fleet conversion and expansion was very great. 
240 of the 266 steel and wooden vessels constructed throughout Canada 
under the program were built for the Atlantic fleet. 232 of the 240 (ail 
but 8 longliners) were otter trawlers and draggers (small wooden otter 
trawlers). 
In sum, the three trawlers that had somehow weathered the govern-
mental restrictions (1930 to 1942) had increased to 11 by 1946, but by 
1966, the Atlantic offshore fleet had 397 otter trawlers ,166 of them 
(over 41%) were over 100 gross tons. 85% of the Atlantic offshore fleet 
had been built after 1952. 67% were less than nine years old, and 42% 
were less than five years old. 
EFFECTS CN OUTPUT AND LANDED VALUES 
Analysis of Nova Scotia landings 15 and landed values from 1945-
1970 makes clear the effect of fleet modernization on output. A single 
linear régression équation could not be fitted either to the data on landings, 
or landed values. The slope coefficients for the years 1960-1970 are at 
least five times greater than those for the years 1945-1959 for both land-
ings and landed value trend lines (see figures 1 and 2). 
Evidence on the shift from Inshore to Offshore landings and values 
is equally pronounced. Table 1 summarizes the changes in landings, 
landed values, and in both per fisherman, comparing Inshore with Off-
shore data for the three benchmark years 1919, 1949, 1969. 
Of the 134% overall increase in total landings from 1919-1969, 
only 17% accrued between 1919 and 1949, while 99% occured between 
1949 and 1969. But the overall Inshore share of the increase was only 
11%, viz..., 15% to 1949, &-3.4% between 1949 and 1969... Offshore 
landings conversely rose by 295% overall, and inversely to Inshore 
landings by period : 21% up to 1949, and 227% from 1949 to 1969. 
In 1919, Inshore and Offshore landings were 57% and 43% res-
pectively of total landings. Thèse proportions still held to within 1% 
(56% and 44%) until 1949. But by 1969, Inshore landed volume had 
fallen proportionately to 27% of the total as against 73% by the Off-
shore fishermen. 
15 ibid., pp. 71-81. 
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l Ibid., p. 73. 
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TABLE 1 
Total, Inshore, and Offshore Comparative Statistics on Nova Scotia 
Landings, Fisherman, Landings per Fisherman, Landed Value, 
Landed Value per Fisherman for 1919, 1949 and 1969. ' (AU 
signs are positive except as noted). 
Percentage change Per cent of total 
1969/19 1949/19 1969/49 1919 1949 1969 
Total Landings 134 
Inshore Landings 11 
Offshore Landings 295 
Total Fishermen —47 
Inshore Fishermen —54 
Offshore Fishermen —24 
Total Landings per 
Fisherman 340 
Inshore Landings 
per Fisherman 139 
Offshore Landings 
per Fisherman 423 
Total Landed Value 2 496 
Inshore Value 273 
Offshore Value 537 
Total Landed-Value 
per Fisherman 835 
Inshore Landed Value 
per Fisherman 704 
Offshore Landed 
Value per Fisherman 743 
1 Ibid., p. 76. 
2
 Ail Landed Value are in current $. 
80% of the basic groundfish cod, and 85% of the haddock are now 
taken Offshore. 70% of the Pélagie Pollock and 68% of the herring, 
traditionally an Inshore fishery, are now landed by Offshore vessels. 
As a very gross measure of total productivity, landings in lbs. per 
fisherman also gives corresponding évidence of the great change in the 
two fisheries' relative output (cf. Table 1). Of the overall 139% increase 
17 99 
15 -3.4 
21 227 
-33 -21 
-39 -24 
-11 -16 
74 154 
89 27 
35 288 
39 203 
89 97 
35 373 
143 285 
210 159 
51 460 
57 56 27 
43 44 73 
77 70 68 
23 30 32 
53 
47 
62 
38 
40 
60 
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in Inshore landings per man, only 27% was gained 1949-69. Of the 
423% increase in overall Offshore landings per man, 288% was achieved 
1949-69. 
Constant dollar proportional changes in landed values for Nova 
Scotia are given in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 1 
1969/1919 1949/1919 1969/1949 
Total Value 49 10 36 
Inshore 12 27 - 1 2 
Offshore 91 - 1 0 112 
Total Value/Fisherman 181 63 73 
Inshore/Man 141 108 16 
Offshore/Man 153 .01 151 
1
 The Data are the same as those in Table 1 to which an index of fish priées 
(1935-39 average priées base) was applied. The index was created by splicing the 
1960-based index for récent data to the existing 1935-39 index. Not an élégant 
solution but the results seem reasonable. 
Despite the way lobster priées bolster Inshore values, by 1969, 
the proportion of landings and landed values for Nova Scotia are greatly 
weighted toward the Offshore fisheries. The Nova Scotia summary data 
in Table 3, reflect the gênerai trend for ail Atlantic Canada. 
TABLE 3 1 
Nova Scotia Total Landings and Values, Values/Fisherman, 
and Average Priées/lb., by Inshore and Offshore (1969) i 
Quantity % Value 
'000 Ibs. Total $000, Total 
Average 
Price/lb. 
Value per 
fisherman ($s) 
Inshore 198,169 27 $22,718 40 $ .115 $2866 
Offshore 537,383 73 $33,921 60 $ .063 $8950 
Total 735,552 $56,639 $ .077 $4834 
ï Ibid., Appendix F. 
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THE EFFECT ON FISHERMEN'S STATUS 
The new Offshore fleet created an industrial corps of fishermen 
who hâve no capital stake whatever (or hope of it) in the vessel, and 
work for the processor as hired hands, but whose method of payment 
remains a hangover from the days of fishing on vessel shares. Never-
theless, the idea that the vessel owners were selling the catch, « for the 
account of ail, » and that fishermen share with the owners the « hope 
of profit and the risk of loss » in a joint venture persists as a légal 
anachronism. 
In truth, intégration of the modem Offshore fleet with processing 
makes the coadventurers doctrine untenable. Without a wholesale ground-
fish auction market as there is in New England (expect perhaps in the 
limited « blind hail » auction for halibut), or for that matter without 
collective bargaining, it is the vessel owner who sets landings level fish 
priées in the first instance, and who then « buys » his own fish from his 
own vessels as raw material for his processing and wholesaling opérations. 
For the processor-vessel owner then, the landings level market for Off-
shore fish is in fact also a labour market for the services of his crews. 
In keeping with the légal concept of a labour market, the Shares-
men's terms of employaient are entirely those of « master and servant », 
and satisfy the most rigorous application of the several common law tests 
for an employer-employée relationship. The vessel and its crew are en-
tirely under control of the captain and owner in ail matters including 
the économies of the fishing. Employment is by verbal agreement at 
dockside to fish for one trip under the customary share arrangements 
(even when thèse are subsumed in union contracts). The share propor-
tions clearly cover the owners fixed as well as variable fishing costs : the 
Nova Scotia groundfish lay is 37% of Gross stock to the crew and 63% 
to the owners. 
Given the share system, however, the Canadian courts chose to 
approach fishermen's employment status through partnership law.16 
Though the basis for even the very limited sort of partnership implied 
by a joint or co-adventure seems entirely to be overridden by the em-
ployment character of the fishermen's relations with the owners. Yet, 
!6 Ibid., pp. 210-215. Where the Canadian courts to follow marine rather 
than partnership law the notion of the seamen's, whalers', fishermen's « share » as 
a form of wage payment would be clearly established by old and strong précèdent. 
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even if the courts' support of the joint-adventure persists, the courts' 
view is seriously damaged by the nature of the économie relationships. 
Under modem conditions, the processor-owners, influence over land-
ings level fish priées subverts the notion of the share System as a part-
nership on grounds of conflict of interest between owner and fisherman, 
e.g., the very basis of labour law, since the fish is a raw material cost 
for the vessel owner's processing plant. 
The courts' conception of a joint venture is certainly not a very 
profitable one for the fishermen. 75% or more of the Offshore fishermen 
are deckhands or fishhold workers whose average net earnings for 
Atlantic Canada are about $4,000 for an average 5,000 hours at sea 
per year, worked under often hazardous, and certainly uncomfortable 
conditions. 
MARKET STRUCURE AND BARGAINING STATUS n 
The inévitable effect of capital concentration in large trawler fleets, 
and in corollary processing and wholesaling of fish is concentration of 
market power in the hands of the largest processors. 
Oligopsony stabilized by strong price leadership describes the pri-
mary fish markets of Nova Scotia and Atlantic Canada well. Real, rather 
than potential submarket monopsony is évident. 
Again, using Nova Scotia as an example : we hâve one very large 
processor, the only one well integrated vertically into the secondary 
markets ; five large firms but each having less than a third the output 
of the major producer ; and another eight firms less than a quarter the 
size of the second tier firms. Together, thèse 14 firms (out of 218 pro-
cessors and buyers) account for almost ail the Nova Scotia groungfish 
exports. (« Export » includes sale in Canadian Central and Western 
markets, but refers mainly to the U.S. market which takes over 75% 
of the groundfish, most of the scallops, and well over 50% of the 
lobsters. ) 
Ease of entry and difficulty of exit reinforces the pattern of many 
very small firms, and few large ones. In this market structure, the priées 
17 lbid., pp. 138-167. 
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set by the largest firm to its own trawlers form the base for the entire 
landings level price structure in groundfish. 
Vessel ownership patterns, too, strongly reinforce market power. 
Where processors do not own outright, they invest in vessels, and lend 
capital to fishermen. 54% of ail Offshore vessels, and ail of the vessels 
over 100 gross tons are completely processor owned, i.e., processors 
« buy » their own fish. Another 29% are owned by private joint stock 
companies of fishermen having substantial processor equity, and which 
therefore sell to designated (invested) processors as a quid pro quo for 
floating the company, and thus making the would be owner-fishermen 
eligible for vessel subsidies. Thus, 83% of the Nova Scotia Sharesmen 
(about 3,000) work on processor owned or strongly influenced vessels. 
The financial independence of the remaining Offshore vessels is alleged 
to be more nominal than real in most instances. 
Independent fishermen are similarly « enthralled ». The isolation 
and relative immobility of thèse Inshore fishermen in Atlantic Canada 
helps extend the major processors' hegemony in price détermination from 
the processors' own fleets in the large fishing centres to the independent 
fishermen in the small outports. Added processor influence dérives simi-
larly from extension of capital for, as well as direct investment in the 
« Independent » Fishermen's boats, but also, from the custom of lending 
working capital, and providing critical services to the boatowners, again, 
with sales agreements as quid pro quo. « Dépendent Contractors » 18 rather 
than « Independent Fishermen » is a far more accurate désignation for 
the market position of Atlantic Canada's small-boat owners. 
THE LEGAL REMEDY 
Actual, rather than potential monopsony power stems then from the 
size distribution of firms, the extent of processor vessel ownership and 
equity, outport isolation with its limited capital, mobility, and alternatives 
to fishermen, and not least, from the Marshallian « very short run » in 
which the Independent Fishermen, with inadéquate public freezing and 
holding facilities, must dispose of their fish. In view of the fishermen's 
traditional attempts to unionize and bargain collectively with processors 
as a solution to their weak market position, bilateralization of both the 
18 The source of this term is the excellent, H.W. ARTHURS, «The Dépen-
dent Contracter : A Study of the Légal Problems of Countervailing Power », Uni-
versity of Toronto Law Journal, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Vol. XVI, 
No. 1, 1965. 
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labour market for Sharesmen, and Independent Fishermen's primary 
markets for raw fish seems a very reasonable remedy. 
There is, as mentioned above, the complex constitutional problem 
of governmental légal jurisdiction over fishermen's collective bargaining. 
If one sets aside the question of whether the fédéral or provincial gov-
ernments should legislate the collective bargaining rights of Canadian 
fisherman, how to do so is clear. Sharesmen should be defined as 
« employées » unequivocally, and included in the appropriate trade 
union act. Independent Fishermen may then be defined as « dépendent 
contractors », and also included. For either or both actions to be effective, 
the anti-combines act must be amended to exclude bargaining over fish 
priées by fishermen from restraint of trade restrictions. Fish priées loom 
too large as an earnings variable to be eliminated as a bargainable item. 
The anti-combines problem has been too long the source of légal snares. 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND FISHERIES ECONOMICS 
Some writers explicitly recognize the possibility of monopsonistic 
« exploitation » of fishermen's immobility.19 One writer opts unequivo-
cally for collective bargaining by fishermen on human grounds.20 But 
conclusions of the main body of fisheries economics 21 imply that collec-
tive bargaining by fishermen is fruitless or worse. Open-access, « common 
property » resources (fisheries), it is said, are typically overexploited 
and yield no rent. Entry ceases only when average cost equals average 
revenue, but at this point maximum biologically sustainable fish yields 
were by passed and marginal yields are négative so that at the « equi-
librium » point (where AC = AR) marginal cost exceeds marginal 
revenue. 
19 James A. CRUTCHFIELD, «Collective Bargaining in the Pacific Coast 
Fisheries : The Economie Issues » ; Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 
8, No. 4 ; July, 1955, pp. 541-556 ; see also James A. CRUTCHFIELD and Giulio 
PONTECORVO, The Pacific Salmon Fisheries, pub. for Resources for the Future, 
by Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1969, pp. 35-36. 
20
 Roger L. RANDLE, «Labour Agreements in the West Coast Fishing In-
dustry : Restraint of Trade or Basis of Industrial Stability ? » Industrial and La-
bour Relations Review, July 1950, pp. 514-541. 
21
 The now very extensive literature perhaps begins with, H. Scott GORDON, 
« The Economie Theory of a Common-Property Resource : The Fishery », The 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXII, No. 2, April 1954, pp. 124-142 ; and, 
Anthony SCOTT, «The Fishery : The Objective of Sole Ownership», The Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. LXIII, No. 2, April, 1955, pp. 116-124. 
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The analysis tacitly rests on acceptance of the coadventurers doc-
trine, and treats ail fishermen as entrepreneurs. This can be a substantial 
error in the assumptions for Atlantic Canada, especially since processor 
and fish buyer monopsony seems very real regardless of fishermen cate-
gory. The supply curves for both Sharesmen's labour (most Offshore 
fishermen) and for raw fish in the Independent Fisherman's submarkets 
hâve a clearly positive slope in the relevant range. The relationship 
between the processor and (both types of) fishermen suggests thait factor 
market analysis is not only appropriate, but reveals some « rent », and 
therefore room for negotiations over fish priées and shares. 
However, in the Canadian East Coast context, even negotiation of 
fish priées above zero-rent levels need not necessarily diminish fisher-
men's shares.22 Direct price elasticity of demand for individual fish 
species can be « high » but is well less than unity for « ail fish and fish 
products ». Income elasticity of demand is positive, and per capita con-
sumption is stable : ail estimâtes reflect secular trends. Moreover, Ca-
nadian Atlantic fishermen hâve a distinct and ongoing (at least 1948-
1974) cost advantage in the major U.S. markets. 
Given the very large présent Canadian East Coast fisheries vessel 
and shoreside processing plant investment, short-run elasticity of factor 
substitution is zéro, and quite low in the long-run Oi > <*). Elasticity of 
derived demand (for fishermen and raw fish) should be less than unity 
even in the fairly long run. The secular supply trend, however, is gloomy, 
and foreshadows continued rises in retail priées, but not because of fisher-
men's negotiations. Despite unionization and ex-vessel price increases 
since 1969, the processors' « spread » has remained constant to the 
présent. 
For Atlantic Canada, standard fisheries analysis seems irrelevant 
with regard to unionization, and fishermen should be encouraged to 
unionize and bargain on économie as well as social grounds. 
22 For the following conclusions, see again The Dissertation, pp. 299-324. 
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Quelques aspects économiques du droit de négociation 
dans les pêcheries de l'Atlantique 
Les pêcheurs canadiens ne jouissent que de droits de négociation limités. A 
l'exception de dispositions récentes, partielles et nullement éprouvées, ils sont pour 
la plupart exclus de la législation du travail. Les propriétaires de bateaux de pêche 
sont écartés en tant qu'entrepreneurs. Des décisions judiciaires répétées excluent 
aussi les pêcheurs « participants » (non-propriétaires) en les considérant comme 
des associés à responsabilité limitée plutôt que comme des salariés, parce qu'ils 
sont rémunérés au prorata des prises. De plus, à quelques exceptions près, proprié-
taires et coparticipants s'exposent à des poursuites en vertu de la Loi relative aux 
enquêtes sur les coalitions s'ils concluent avec les acheteurs une convention collec-
tive fixant le prix du poisson... variable hasardeuse de leurs revenus. Le louage 
de services échappe à ses sanctions, mais non pas la pêche. 
Cet article vise à démontrer que, depuis la deuxième guerre mondiale, les 
changements technologiques ont révolutionné les flottilles de pêche de haute mer, 
formé un corps de pêcheurs sans propriété qui sont, quoique en disent les tribu-
naux, les « salariés » des propriétaires de bateaux. Le marché primaire du poisson 
brut est aussi un marché du travail pour les services des pêcheurs. 
Étant donné que la demande passée pour le poisson salé s'est déplacée vers le 
poisson frais, le centre de gravité économique de l'industrie de la pêche dans l'Atlan-
tique s'est également déplacé des pêcheurs côtiers (propriétaires indépendants de 
petites embarcations) vers les usines de mises en marché et de transformation 
installées sur le rivage et financées par les flottilles de pêche en haute mer, d'où 
il s'ensuit que les propriétaires des usines « achètent » leur propre poisson. Ainsi, 
l'industrie se trouve-t-elle structurée de telle façon qu'elle compte quelques grandes 
et beaucoup de petites entreprises de préparation et de vente. 
L'isolement et la relative immobilité des pêcheurs côtiers favorisent l'hégé-
monie des grandes usines de transformation dans la fixation des prix à commencer 
par leurs propres flottilles dans les grands ports de pêche jusqu'aux petits havres 
de partance. L'influence accrue des grandes usines de transformation provient 
encore du fait qu'elles financent directement les bateaux des pêcheurs indépendants, 
mais aussi de la coutume qui s'est implantée d'avancer à cette catégorie de pêcheurs 
le capital de roulement et de leur fournir des services comportant un certain risque 
en retour de contrats de vente compensatoires. L'oligopsone, stabilisé par le leader-
ship que les usines de préparation exerce sur les prix, caractérise donc l'état des 
marchés primaires du poisson dans les provinces de la Côte Atlantique. 
De cette analyse, force est de conclure que la loi est illogique et injuste en 
écartant les «coparticipants» du statut de «salarié». Un sous-marché monopsone 
réel plus que potentiel montre que le remède se trouverait, d'une part, dans l'exis-
tence d'un marché du travail pour les « coparticipants » et, d'autre part, de mar-
chés du poisson brut pour les pêcheurs indépendants qui seraient alors tenus pour 
des « entrepreneurs dépendants ». Il faudrait enfin que ces gens-là ne tombent pas 
sous le coup des sanctions de la Loi relative aux enquêtes sur les coalitions. 
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L'analyse économique permet de constater que la négociation collective pour-
rait remédier à la situation. Les courbes de l'offre tant pour le travail de pêcheur 
que pour le poisson brut s'orientent vers la hausse. L'étude des facteurs relatifs 
au marché indique qu'il y a place pour des négociations avec les usines de trans-
formation au-delà de ce qu'on pourrait appeler le « loyer ». Même la négociation 
des prix du poisson au-dessus des niveaux de « loyer-zéro » ne diminuerait pas 
nécessairement la part des pêcheurs. L'élasticité naturelle de la demande pour des 
espèces données de poisson peut être « forte », mais elle l'est beaucoup moins 
lorsqu'on considère l'ensemble du marché du poisson. L'élasticité des revenus tirés 
de la demande présente un caractère positif et la consommation par habitant est 
stable. Sans inclure les statistiques pour l'année 1974, toutes les évaluations font 
voir une tendance constante vers la hausse. De plus, les pêcheurs canadiens de 
l'Atlantique bénéficient aussi d'un avantage supplémentaire pour amortir leurs 
coûts sur les marchés américains. 
Compte tenu des sommes investies par les pêcheries canadiennes en équipe-
ment, l'élasticité du facteur remplacement est nulle à court terme et basse à long 
terme (n > o"). En ce qui concerne la demande (pêcheurs et poisson brut), l'élas-
ticité devrait être moindre que la stabilité au cours d'une période relativement 
longue. Cependant, la tendance imprévisible de l'offre a pour effet de rejeter dans 
l'ombre le phénomène des hausses de prix de détail quand on le considère en 
longue période, mais cela n'a rien à voir avec le droit de négociation pour les 
pêcheurs. 
Pour les économistes spécialisés dans l'industrie des pêcheries, la négociation 
collective serait pour le moins stérile pour les pêcheurs parce que, à cause de 
la « propriété en commun » de ressources auxquelles tout le monde a libre accès, les 
pêcheries sont surexploitées et ne rendent pas. Les arrivages ne cessent que lorsque 
le coût moyen des prises égale le revenu moyen qu'elles rapportent, mais, à ce 
stade, les rendements maximaux de poisson biologiquement soutenables sont dépas-
sés et les coûts marginaux dépassent les revenus marginaux, ces derniers étant néga-
tifs au point d'équilibre. 
L'analyse est juste, mais elle s'appuie implicitement sur la théorie de la « co-
participation » et considère l'ensemble des pêcheurs comme des entrepreneurs. En 
agissant ainsi, on ignore complètement le facteur d'analyse des marchés et on sous-
estime la situation de monopsone existant du côté des acheteurs. En conséquence, 
en ce qui a trait à la négociation collective, l'analyse n'est pas juste dans le cas 
des pêcheries canadiennes de l'Atlantique et l'on devrait favoriser la syndicalisation 
des pêcheurs de cette région. 
